By Nino Oktorino
During theirs invasion days, the Japanese proclaimed themselves as “the old brother” who come to liberate theirs “Indonesian younger brother” from the Dutch colonialism. Thus, many Indonesian greet the Japanese soldiers as liberators. However, the Japanese attitude changes drastically after the Dutch surrender.
Actually, the Japanese never wished to foster any kind of Indonesian independence movement in the first place. The last thing the Japanese wanted was a manifestation of this spirit that might prove unfavorable to their war effort. Hence, after placed Indonesia under Southern Army Area under Field-Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi, Japanese divided the country into three occupation zones: Java by the 16th Army, Sumatra under the 25th Army and the rest under the 2nd Southern Fleet. These became various political units with tight Japanese control together with separate administration, it was meant to discourage any filtering of nationalist aspiration from Java to the outer islands. Political activities fell to an all-time low as from March 1942, all political activities were banned and all existing associations were dissolved. However, as their holy war against West became defensive, the Japanese were clearly going to have to arm Indonesians to help theirs own war-efforts against the Allied.
The First Volunteers
Maybe the first Indonesian volunteer that served with Japan Army was Raden Soedjono. Born from a Java nobility family, Soedjono educated in Dutch schools and in law at Leiden. He later accepted a language fellowship in Tokyo and helped train Japanese officers in Indonesia language. He later back to his homeland with Japanese expeditionary forces in March 1942 as a colonel of Japanese army and served as theirs translator.
During theirs invasion into Indonesia, Japanese recruited some Indonesians to serve as theirs fifth-column. The most important of them were Acehnese, an Indonesian tribe in North Sumatra. The Japanese Army HQ know about the Acehnese Islamic warrior reputation (the Dutch need more than 30 bloody years to conquered Aceh) when General Sugiyama ordered Major Fujiwara Iwaichi, the commander of F-Kikan special force, to build some relations with Acehnese and spread pro-Japanese and anti-Dutch feeling among these people.
One of the first Fujiwara’s Acehnese contact was Sahid Abu Bakar, a religious teacher who lived in Kedah (Malaya). Another Acehnese who became his agent was Mohammad Saleh. This man served as F-Kikan propagandist during the invasion. Before the invasion, a Japanese officer named Masabuchi formed a small Aceh unit. They got some tasks: to spread pro-Japan sentiments among the people; to hinder any attempts by the Dutch to destroyed every vital objects in Aceh; to help Japanese soldiers to get food, water, and intelligence info; and collected every weapons which left by the Dutch.
Before Japanese invasion to Aceh, some contingents of F-Kikan’s Aceh agents had been send from Selangor to theirs homeland to seek collaboration with the PUSA, the Islamic nationalist organization in Aceh. Some of them were captured by the Dutch coast guard. However, the remaining could establish contact with the PUSA leadership and start a rebellion against theirs Dutch master. Hundreds of F-Kikan men, who could easily identified by theirs “F” armband, attacking both the Dutch troops and officials and. during the night in March 11, they and theirs PUSA ally succeed to captured Kotaraja, the provincial capital. Thus, when Japan’s Konoye Shidan Division landed in Kotaraja on March 12, there were no shots heard and there were no Japanese that killed during the process.
Paramilitary Units
On April 29, 1943, coincidentally with ‘Tenscho Setsu’ (the Emperor Birthday), Japanese army leadership in Jakarta gave an order to form a total defense system from big cities to remote places by including military discipline within it. Thus, they start to organized Indonesian settlement like in Japan. According the rule, a settlement that consisted of 10 to 15 families must be organized into a ‘Tonari Gumi’ (block organization). ‘Tonari Gumi’ leader was chosen by its member and called as ‘Kumicho’. Five or six ‘Tonari Gumis’ were joined into a ‘Chokai’ (orchard organization). The ‘chokai’ was lead by a ‘Chokaicho’, whom chose by ‘kumichos’.
In every ‘chokai’, Japanese formed ‘Keibodan’ (security column or police auxiliary) consisted from local youths between 20-25 years (later become 26-35 years). ‘Keibodan’ got a ‘kyoren’ training, like how to handle fire, to face an air attack, etc. To handle theirs job, ‘Keibodan’ members have an obligation to stand by in guardhouses in their ‘Chokai’ area and made a night watching. Theirs weapons are ‘takeyari’ (sharp bamboos). In Java, there were one million ‘Keibodan’ members. In Sumatra, ‘Keibodan’ was known as ‘Bogadan’, while in Borneo known as ‘Borneo Konen Hokokudan’. The formation itself had been under a tight control by Japanese to avoid Indonesian nationalist influences among theirs rank.
Japanese also tried to seed militaristic spirit among Indonesian teenagers. Thus, Indonesian teenagers between 14 to 20 years were formed into ‘Seinendan’ (Youth Column). According Japan propaganda, ‘Seinendan’ was a tool to educate and to train Indonesian youths, thus would enable them to defend their homeland by theirs own strength. There were ‘Seinendan’ formations in every level area. Japanese also formed ‘Seinendan’ in factories (called as ‘Seinendan Kojo’) and farms (called as ‘Seinendan Jogyojo’). In every residency, Japanese formed ‘Seinen Kurensho’ (‘Seinendan’ Training Ground). In Jakarta, there was a ‘Chuo Seinen Kurensho’ (‘Seinendan Training Centre’) to train ‘Seinendan’ regional leaders for three to six months. There were almost a half million ‘Seinendan’ members in Java during the war.
Japanese also formed a paramilitary formations in junior and senior high schools called ‘Gokkutotai’ (Student Column). They were train in basic military education, included how to fight. Every high schools became a ‘chutai’ (company) headquarter; every class became a ‘shotai’ (section). Some ‘shotais’ were joined to form a ‘butai’ (squad). Japanese military leaders hope that ‘Gokkutotai’ will become seed for ‘heiho’, ‘kaigun’ (Japanese Navy) or ‘jibakutai’ (suicide troops).
Indonesian girls and women also didn’t escape from Japanese military mobilization. In August 1943, Japanese formed ‘Fujinkai’ (Women Column). The organization members were girls and women above 15 years. They got military basic training, but their main training was to handle general kitchen and first-aid. They also were mobilized for ‘kinrohoshi’ (labor voluntary service) because many of theirs men were use for military service. Existed in every village, ‘Fujinkai’ were ordered by Japanese to help them to collect obliged donations like jewelry, livestock, foodstuffs, etc. for theirs war efforts.
By forming these paramilitary units, every Indonesian between 14 to 35 years were train to become militants to help Japanese war efforts against possibility Allied landing in Indonesia.
Heiho
When Japanese military victims mounted after the Allied start theirs offensives in all fronts, Tokyo start to thought to recruit Southeast Asians in theirs occupation areas as the replacements. Those volunteers were called as ‘Heiho’ (auxiliary soldiers). However, ‘Heiho’ wasn’t an individual unit. In was only a commonly name for Southeast Asian volunteers that served in Japan army. They were incorporated into Japanese unit as individual rather than taking the risk of setting-up this kind of a motivated military structure with its more independent character.
On April 22, 1943, the 7th Japanese Army HQ in Saigon proclaimed that they give a chance for Indonesian youths to join with theirs army as ‘heiho’. ‘Sendenbu’ (Japan propaganda service) propagandize that ‘heiho’ would became a chance for Indonesian youths to serve theirs homeland and nation.
Many Indonesian youths listed as volunteers. After receive theirs training for some months, thousands of ‘heihos’ were send to frontline to fight the Allied. They were involved in many battlefields, like Burma, Rabaul, Morotai, Balikpapan, etc. According some Japanese sources, ‘heihos’ usually have more better training and weaponry than theirs PETA counterpart and fought fanatically like theirs own troops.
When the wind of war start to turn against Japan, Japanese became more eager to recruit Indonesian volunteers as theirs ‘Heiho’. For theirs propaganda, ‘Sendenbu’ made many stories to propagandize ‘Heiho’ heroism to attract more Indonesian youths. One of theirs work was a story about “Heiho Amat” (Amat is commonly name among Indonesian Muslims). According the fiction story, Amat made a ‘jibaku’ (suicide attack) against an Allied fortified position by taken a bomb with him. The bomb destroyed the Allied position and Amat body shatter with the explosion.
As a Japan auxiliary troops, ‘Heiho’ served on individually base and had been lead by Japanese officers. During the war, there were 42,500 Indonesian who served as ‘heiho’. About 2,500 of them come from Timor, 25,000 from Java, and the remaining came from other areas.
PETA and Giyu-gun
Reversal of the tides of war and the cumulative message of their own appeal to nationalism-within-Asianism required Japan to look for additional native auxiliary military forces among Indonesians. On September 8, 1943, the GHQs of Japanese Southern Army in Saigon issued an order to form “Kyodo Bo-ei Giyu-gun” (a voluntary army to protect the native land). Two formations of Giyu-gun were formed in Army zone occupations in Indonesian, one in Sumatra under the 25th Army and the other in Java under the 16th Army. Interestingly, Japanese gave permission to Indonesian nationalist leadership to called “Jawa Bo-ei Giyugun” as the PETA (Pembela Tanah Air, or Defenders of the Motherland). It seem theirs decisions had been influenced by the fact that Java was more modernized than Sumatra or other parts of the archipelago. Beside, majority of Indonesian nationalist leaders live in the island.
Concerning the PETA, which later became the leadership core of the Indonesian army that fought the Dutch during Independence War of Indonesia (1945-49), there were many myths about the background of its founding. Soekarno, Indonesian nationalist main figure during the time and later became her first president, alleges that he handpicked the head of PETA, chose “young men whom (he) could control”, and single-handedly proposed” men who “could eventually become the heroes of (the) revolution.” Juxtaposed with this gross untruth is an engaging half truth from Gatot Mangkupradja, a nationalist who had stood trial with Sukarno under the Dutch rule in 1929. He claims that his proposal of a volunteer army, countering one for a conscript army by a prominent Javanese in September 1943, led the Kenpetai to pick him up for questioning and take him to the Japanese chief of staff, Major General Sato, who came around to the idea.
In fact, the idea of PETA is traceable to Japanese contingency planning. Early in 1943, withdrawal of troops to fight in the Solomons-New Guinea area had reduced their defense force in Java to ten thousand. Major General Ineda, then the commander of the Seventh Army in Singapore, conceived the idea of arming Indonesians during an inspection tour of Java and obtained Tojo’s approval (but no funds) during the latter’s visit to Singapore in July 1943. However, the low ebb of theirs military power put Japanese in difficult position to recruit additional the more simpler and safer volunteers like heihos. Thus, Japanese take a new policy of recruitment. As Major General Ineda said: “…Japanese military authority had to appease national sentiment of the population in occupied areas and to acquire their cooperation in achieving the war effort…Therefore, the Japanese had to show that they esteemed Indonesian potentiality and make a pretense of offering chances of political participation.” It’s clear that for the next step, native sponsorship was needed. Gatot spoke out at the right time.
Still the Japanese were jittery. According Mangkupradja story, Sato asked him if he willing “to take the proper punishment if few or none volunteer?” Mangkupradja answer him by pricked his left arm with a pen until it bled and then in his own blood wrote a letter of request to the government in Tokyo. Asia Raya newspaper published it in ordinary newsprint—and so launched the idea to the public. Fortunately to Gatot, the rate of volunteering was high.
Soekarno and Hatta, both of them were most important nationalist leaders, did not learn of the plan until spring. A year later at a large meeting, Soekarno proposed a conscript militia in a fiery speech that ended with the entreaty that all in favor stand. Gatot sat. His counterproposal was for another volunteer organ, which eventually materialized, again with Japanese support. This was the ‘Hizbullah’, a paramilitary unit of Islamic youths designed as a reserve to the PETA, some of whose Muslim officers were assigned to train it. The Japanese were willing to let Soekarno employ his tongue and image in their behalf but would not let him, whatever he later said, screen or indoctrinate candidates for the military. That job went to Beppan (‘Isamu Butai Tokumu Kikan Bunjitsu’, or Special Section Isamu unit), a “special forces” unit with some experience in training Indonesians for intelligence work, now responsible for giving basic military training to PETA volunteers. Candidates applied from all over Java, and Beppan chose them on military grounds, without significant political participation or interference. Total enlistment rose to 38,000, “four times the actual combat strength” of the Japanese 16th Army.
The PETA soldiers wore uniform according Japanese army model. However, they clothes came from ex-KNIL (The Royal Netherland Indies Army) stocks. Thus, the green color of theirs uniforms was same with the KNIL one. Both soldiers and officers wore the same uniform; the different only in theirs shoes case, i.e. officers have high black leather jackboots while ordinary soldiers only use canvass shoes with puttees from ordinary clothes that they wore until theirs knees. They wore Japanese insignias and table ranks.
The PETA have a special official status, i.e. that they have theirs own officers. Japanese officers in theirs units only served as trainers or advisors. However, Japanese always have some doubts about theirs Indonesians auxiliary loyalty. Thus, they didn’t offered military theory and organization to the volunteers. The main training emphasized was physical stamina and “spirit”, which Japanese stressed at all their youth training centers, schools, and auxiliaries. Here it meant “an almost reckless kind of physical courage, defiant of bodily injury and even death.”
The other carefully step that Japanese taken was they didn’t created a joint command for all PETA formations and put the main unit of them only in ‘Daidan’, or battalions, level. There were 66 daidans in Java and 3 others in Bali. Japanese themselves didn’t permit each of ‘Daidan’ to have contact one each other. Theirs main objective is to hindered the spreading of the discontents if one of the auxiliary unit came to mutiny. Thus, contact among daidans only performs by theirs Japanese liason officers.
The Giyu-gun has more lower standards than the PETA. Although they were also under theirs own officers, but theirs ranks were not as high as the PETA officers. Giyu-gun units also didn’t were organized as a loose battalions like theirs counterpart, but had been put directly under the Japanese 25th Army formations and scattered within it ranks.
Mutinies
In 1944, Japanese once mighty empire already shattered. The situation made many Asians started to doubt the continuity of Japanese role as “Asian liberators”. Beside Japanese cruel exploitations against theirs occupied areas created many discontents among native people, including within Indonesian volunteers in Japanese armed forces ranks. In some places, the situation exploded into mutinies.
At Blitar, East Java, on February 14th, 1944, a PETA daidan mutinied under a young lieutenant named Supriyadi. Discriminations in wages and conditions had moved them, as had humiliating punishment for violation of regulations, in particular slap on the head or face. The mutineers killed some of theirs training officers and then run to forests with theirs equipments. However, the Japanese systems that didn’t create a unified command for the PETA and separate each daidans and isolated them within theirs own location work well to put down the mutiny. The mutiny not only didn’t spread among other daidans, but the Japanese also could use other daidans to put down the mutiny in a few days. A court-martial in Jakarta tried 68 men and condemned 8 to death, two of whom later had their sentences commuted. Supriyadi, the leader, disappeared without a clue, either in battle or execution. For years, his name took on magical myths among many Indonesians.
Some other little mutinies happened in other areas. In Aceh, a Giyu-gun cadet deserted with some of his men and formed a small guerilla band. However, the group didn’t long to exist: when Japanese gave an ultimatum for them to choice between surrender or theirs families will be executed, the mutineers choose the first. Japanese captured and executed some of them. In Pangalengan, West Java, some PETA cadets murdered a Japanese instructor. The Kempetai soon captured and executed them.
The last rebellious act of the Indonesian volunteers happened one day after Japanese surrender, when they kidnapped and forced Soekarno and Hatta to proclaimed Indonesian independence. Actually, that’s against Allied order to Japanese to hold a status-quo in theirs occupation areas. However, they keep forced both of Indonesian nationalist leaders. At last, after some thoughts, Soekarno and Hatta agreed with them. Thus, on August 17, 1945, both of Indonesian nationalist leaders proclaimed theirs nation independence.
Former Indonesian volunteers in Japan army became core of the Indonesian fighters’ freedom that fought against the Dutch who tried to reestablish theirs rule during Independence War of Indonesia (1945-1949). After the struggle, many of them occupied important positions in Indonesian military and civilian services, including the second president of the Republic, General Soeharto, who once served in the Kempetai and the PETA.
Bibliography
Dahm, Bernard. Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969.
Friend, Theodore. The Blue-Eyed Enemy: Japan against the West in Java and Luzon, 1942-1945. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988.
Kahin, George McTurnan. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1952.
Lebra, Joyce C. Japanese Trained Armies in South-East Asia. Hongkong: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia), 1977.
Notosusanto, Nugroho. The Peta Army during the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia. Tokyo: Waseda University,1979.
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